Design and anticipation: towards an organisational view of design systems by Zamenopoulos, T & Alexiou, K
Design and 
anticipation: towards 
an organisational view 
of design systems
Theodore Zamenopoulos
 Katerina Alexiou
http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/working_papers/paper76.pdf
Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis • University College London • 1 - 19 Torrington Place • Gower St • London • WC1E 7HB 
T  +44 (0) 20 7679 1782   •   T  +44 (0) 20 7679 1813   •   F  +44 (0) 20 7813 2843    •    E  casa@ucl.ac.uk   www.casa.ucl.ac.uk
W
O
R
K
I
N
G
 
P
A
P
E
R
 
S
E
R
I
E
S
ISSN: 1467-1298 © Copyright CASA, UCL
76
03 | 04Design and anticipation: towards an organisational view of design systems 
Theodore Zamenopoulos and Katerina Alexiou 
 
Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis 
1-19 Torrington Place 
London WC1E 7HB 
t.zamenopoulos@ucl.ac.uk, a.alexiou@ucl.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Although the first attempts to establish a systematic way of studying, teaching and 
practicing design go back to the 1960s (Asimov 1962; Alexander 1963; Archer 1965), we 
are today just as far from agreeing on a definition of design science, let alone a definition 
of design itself. And although we will be discussing here the concept of anticipation and 
its 'repercussions' for the understanding and development of design systems, we will find 
that this paper is about anticipation as it is about scientific explanation. This is because 
the concept of anticipation couples with a special kind of scientific enquiry and 
explanation: an approach to science which takes the view that complex realities (or 
systems) can be better understood by studying their organisational principles, rather than 
building descriptions of their structural components. Research in various fields such as 
systems theory, cybernetics, information theory, artificial intelligence, physics, biology, 
and complexity science, gave birth to concepts (such as entropy, complexity and requisite 
variety) that marked this transition from observations of the state space of a system, to the 
examination of the system itself in terms of its functional components and their relations 
(Rashevsky 1954; Thóm 1972; Rosen 1991). In parallel, the concept of anticipation has 
also emerged as an alternative type of causality or reasoning which seeks to replace the 
reactive, cause-and-effect, Newtonian universe with a proactive one, according to which 
anticipated future states of a system can affect its current states (final cause explanations) 
(Rosen 1985; Dubois and Resconi 1992; Glaserfeld 1998).  
 
It is asserted here, that if transferred to the context of design, the idea of anticipation 
necessitates studying and explaining design abilities on the basis of the organisational 
conditions and characteristics that underlie design systems. Organisational explanations 
are a potentially attractive direction of research because they allow the definition and 
explanation of essential design phenomena (or abilities) irrespective of the specific 
structures we can use to realise them. 
 
In the following will we first review some predominant approaches to anticipation, both 
in natural and artificial systems, and subsequently discuss the concept of anticipation in 
the domain of design with the intention to develop a foundation for a formal definition of 
design systems. 
 
2. Approaches to anticipation in various fields 
Robert Rosen may well be considered as the 'father' of anticipatory systems (1985), even 
though hints and discussions on the concept of anticipation can be found long before that, 
albeit primarily in the context of philosophy, psychology and cognitive science (e.g. 
James 1890; Tolman 1932; Skinner 1938; Piaget 1954; Kelly 1955; Neisser 1975). 
However, Rosen was a biologist - or better a relational biologist - who strove to study, understand and explain the very nature of life using the apparatus of mathematics (Rosen 
1991; 1999), and who in the process also submitted a rigorous re-assessment of physics 
and science in general. His concept of anticipation is tied with the reinstatement of the 
'lost' cause of Aristotelian logic: the final cause. Briefly, the old Aristotelian categories of 
causation (called material cause, formal cause, efficient cause and final cause), 
constituted four distinct ways of answering 'why-questions': the first related to matter, the 
second to form, the third to producer and the fourth to end. According to Rosen, 
explanations of the fourth kind have been excluded from science because they have been 
taken as a direct violation of the traditional notion of causality, by which 'in any law 
governing a natural system, it is forbidden to allow present change of state to depend 
upon future states' (Rosen 1985: 9). Yet, he suggested that finality was the only kind of 
explanation that could be offered to anticipatory behaviour (the ability to foresee or 
predict some future change and accordingly adapt the present state or course of action), 
which is manifested at all levels of biological organisation, from the molecular level up to 
the human level. For him, the idea of building and employing predictive models was also 
a fundamental aspect of science in general, perceived as a means to construct homologies 
between modes of social and biological organisation and sustain a general theory of 
planning, policy generation and decision-making (ibid: 6-7). 
 
Rosen's characterization of an anticipatory system is built on the dual relationship 
between a dynamical system S (running in real time) and a model M of S – another 
dynamical system – that can 'go faster' that real time and therefore predict future 
behaviour. The classic quote from Rosen's writings specifies that an anticipatory system 
is one 'containing a predictive model of itself and/or of its environment, which allows it to 
change state at an instant in accord with the model's predictions pertaining to a later 
instant' (Rosen 1985: 339). Such a system is diagrammatically illustrated in Figure 1, 
where E is an effector via which M and S interact with each other. Through E, input 
information from M is converted to some specific modifications of the dynamics of S; but 
E is also the vehicle through which the states of M are updated to match future states of S. 
Note that this sort of reinforcement and utilisation of information about future states, akin 
to processes of adaptation and learning, is in fact crucial for the generation and guidance 
of the predictive model (see Rosen 1985: 385-390). Rosen noted that the predictions of 
the model M could not in general be perfect and that the discrepancy between actual 
(system) and predicted (model) behaviour, and its growth, corresponds to the discrepancy 
between an open and a closed system. For that reason concluded that a system like this 
should be named quasi-anticipatory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 An anticipatory system as illustrated by Rosen (1985) 
M
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E Environment 
(1) (3)
(2) (2)In fact Rosen's approach is developed in the context of the more generic paradigm of 
'modelling relation', the establishment of relations between a natural system (an aspect, 
member, or element of the external world we wish to study) and a formal system (a 
system we create to represent, model and draw inferences about the natural system). The 
endeavour of modelling relation refers to the consistent encoding of a natural system into 
a formal one, so that the inferences developed within the formal system become 
predictions about the first. Consistency relates to the verifiability of the predictions in the 
natural world when these are decoded into relations in that world (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Modelling relation  
 
 
Within this framework, we can now see M, S and E in Figure 1 as parts of the same 
system  S2 which we consider to be anticipatory. The environment is represented by 
another system S1. Rosen (1985: 344) arrives at the formulation of five conditions 
summarised as follows: 'An anticipatory system S2 is one which contains a model of a 
system S1 with which it interacts. This model is a predictive model; its present states 
provide information about future states of S1. Further, the present state of the model 
causes a change of state in other subsystems of S2; these subsystems are (a) involved in 
the interaction of S2 with S1, and (b) they do not affect (i.e. are unlinked to) the model of 
S1. In general, we can regard the change of state in S2 arising from the model as an 
adaptation, or pre-adaptation, of S2 relative to its interaction with S1' (italics in original).  
 
A pertinent example that epitomises such an anticipatory ability is a class of relational 
cell models called metabolism-repair (M, R)-systems. These systems are characterised by 
two fundamental biological qualities or components: a metabolic component, which can 
be represented as a set of mappings that convert inputs from the environment to outputs, 
and a repair component, which maintains and reconstitutes the metabolic activity. More 
formally, adopting Rosen's notation (1985), if f: A→ B, is a metabolic element in a 
metabolic system, then f belongs to a larger set of physically realisable metabolisms the 
cell can display, denoted by H(A,B). Any process that can generate copies of f must have 
its range in H(A,B): if φf is the repair element, then this will be a mapping into this set. 
Hence the simplest (M, R)-system is given by: 
        
       
(1) 
 
 
 
A  →   B  →  H(A,B) 
f  φf
metabolism repair
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Entailment  Rosen showed that this formalism already contains what is needed for the operation of 
another decisive genetic component: a replication mechanism. This reproductive 
mechanism can be represented by a mapping βb: H(A,B) → H(B, H(A,B)) (under the 
condition that there is an element b in B for which b ˆ -1 ≡ β). An abstract (M, R)-system 
can therefore be expressed by the following diagram: 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
This is the quintessence of a relational model in that the property of replication is entailed 
by the metabolism and replication mappings (or functions); it is constructed on the basis 
of these mappings alone, from the organisation of the system, and independently from 
any particular realisation or structure of the living cell. Let us briefly uncover the 
explanatory attributes of this diagram. For the simple mapping f: A→ B, the question 
'why B' can only have two answers: in terms of material cause ('because a' - the value of 
A) and in terms of efficient cause ('because f'). But B has no explanation in terms of final 
cause – there is nothing to explain B by its effects in this diagram, or to endow it with a 
function (any finalistic answers have to pertain to the external environment of the 
system). On the contrary, f and a can only be explained in finalistic terms: because of 
their function in the diagram, that is to entail B. By extending the original mapping with 
the repair component the function f is efficiently entailed by φf :  
 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
Furthermore, by adding the replication mechanism the mapping φf can also be entailed; 
but it is the fact that B can entail βb that eventually does the trick. In this last diagram 
everything is efficiently entailed and all final cause answers are found within the system. 
Note that only the initial input A originates from the environment.  
 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
 
 
This for Rosen also exemplified the essence of an organism, a system closed to efficient 
causation, which is characteristically non computable (contains non-simulable models). 
Nonetheless, Rosen's examination of anticipatory systems with its associated premises 
has not only been an inspiration for the study of biological worlds, but also for the 
scientific enquiry, understanding, modelling and control of complex systems in general. 
For example, Casti (1992; 2002) discusses Rosen's idea of anticipation in the context of 
control, highlighting that the crucial quality underlining an anticipatory control process, 
A  →   B  →  H(A,B)  →  H(B, H(A,B)) 
f  φf
metabolism repair
βb
replication
A  →   B  →  H(A,B) 
f  φf
A  →   B  →  H(A,B)  →  H(B, H(A,B)) 
f  φf βbin contrast to classical (or reactive) control processes, 'is the notion of self-reference' 
(Casti 1992: 167). The idea of a system containing an internal model of itself is linked to 
the ability of a system to control not only its operation, but also its fabrication/structure 
and the way it evolves and adapts. In the above (M, R) formalism, the boundary 
conditions of the repair and replication mappings, serve as an internal self-model of the 
cell, allowing it to exert control over its own behaviour (Casti 2002: 12).  
 
In the domain of intelligent systems, Tsoukalas with his colleagues has elaborated fuzzy 
logic and neural computing concepts and techniques for the development of anticipatory 
control systems (Xinqing et al 1996; Tsoukalas 1998). This approach to anticipation 
considers systems that can determine current action (or take decisions) on the basis of 
current as well as anticipated states. On the core of these systems is a predictive neural 
network model working in synergy with a fuzzy rule base used to determine the 'one-step-
ahead' predictive control input. The overall architecture of such a control system is given 
in Figure 3, where u(k) is the control input, yn(k+1) is the predicted neural output, yd(k+1) 
is the desired output and yp(k) is the plant output. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 The structure of a neurofuzzy anticipatory control system as illustrated by Tsoukalas (1998) 
 
 
It is worth mentioning here that Rosen's own view of the main difference between 
classical control and this kind of anticipatory control lies in the predictive character of the 
implicit model; while classical control rests on feedback regulation through the use of an 
error signal, anticipatory control rests on feedforward regulation through the use of model 
prediction (pre-adaptation) (Rosen 1985: 42). This has implications on the way final 
causation is expressed. In cybernetics, finality is connected to an externally defined 
purpose or a desired final state that the controller tries to reach or maintain. On the 
contrary, Rosen's idea considers finality without commitment to some ultimate goal - the 
existence of a goal is instead relative to the model (and the model alone) and hence is to a 
degree conjectural. For an overview and discussion on purpose, finality and teleological 
explanations see Boden (1972), George and Johnson (1985) and Stout (1996).  
 
Another prominent approach to research in anticipatory systems is advocated by Dubois 
(Dubois 1997; Dubois 1998; Dubois 2000). Starting from a divergent position to that of 
Rosen, he suggests that anticipation is not a characteristic of biological systems alone (a 
trait of life), but is fundamentally present in all physical systems. In particular, he asserts 
that Rosen's notion constitutes a special (weak) form of anticipation as it is founded on 
Learning Rule
Fuzzy Rules  Plant 
Neural Prediction  Σ
yp(k) 
yn(k+1) 
u(k)  yd(k+1) 
yn(k+1) model-based prediction, and discusses a formulation where anticipation as change of 
current state according to initial as well as final conditions is achieved at a system level. 
His alternative interpretation is based on the concepts of incursion (implicit recursion) 
and hyperincursion (incursion with multiple solutions).  
 
More specifically, Dubois describes Rosen's anticipatory system S as a set of differential 
equations as follows (M denotes the predictive model): 
 
(5a) 
 
(5b) 
 
 
His alternative proposition, where the future state of the system S and the model M at 
time t+∆t is a function F of this system S at time t and of the model M at a later time step 
t+∆t (Dubois 1998: 5), is written as follows: 
 
(6a) 
 
(6b) 
 
 
The above system exemplifies the concept of incursion, where future state is computed in 
a self-referential manner. Dubois uses the concepts of incursion and hyperincursion as a 
method to investigate and develop a series of formal models, ranging from control of 
feedback and chaotic systems, to the generation of fractals from incursive automata and 
digital wave equations. The driving force for this programme seems to be the 
development of a new computational paradigm or, more accurately, a new abstract 
computational machine (a generalised Turing machine) that takes into account final 
causation.  
 
As a matter of fact, Dubois's view summarises the main discussion points in research 
relevant to anticipatory systems: whether anticipation is a unique characteristic of 
biological systems or extends to all complex systems (biological, natural, and artificial), 
and whether anticipation can be realised computationally. In between Rosen and Dubois, 
there exists a multitude of views about anticipation and lively arguments about the 
conditions that enable anticipatory behaviour to arise (e.g. predictive power, entailment, 
the existence of an internal model, memory, language, learning, autonomy, adaptability 
etc) and the structures that can implement it. These questions are increasingly being 
debated in yet another field, that of adaptive systems, autonomous agents, and multi-agent 
systems.  
 
Butz et al (2003) offer a classification of anticipatory mechanisms used in the context of 
artificial adaptive learning systems. In particular they distinguish four classes of 
mechanisms: implicitly anticipatory mechanisms in which no prediction is made but 
anticipations are built-in in the behavioural structure or algorithm of the adaptive system; 
payoff anticipatory mechanisms in which predictions are restricted to possible payoffs of 
future actions; sensorial anticipatory mechanisms in which a predictive model of the 
environment is used to predict input stimuli and influence sensorial processing; and state 
anticipatory mechanisms in which an explicit predictive model forms predictions about 
∆S/∆t= [S(t+∆t) – S(t)]/∆t = F[S(t), M(t+∆t)] 
∆M/∆t= [M(t+∆t) – M(t)]/∆t = G[M(t)] 
∆S/∆t= [S(t+∆t) – S(t)]/∆t = F[S(t), M(t+∆t)] 
∆M/∆t= [M(t+∆t) – M(t)]/∆t = F[S(t), M(t+∆t)]future states in order to directly influence current action and decision making. Inevitably 
the question about the applicability of an internal predictive model is of central 
importance here, as it also related to the debate about the suitability of reactive versus 
cognitive/deliberative approaches in artificial intelligence. Most researchers however are 
increasingly inclined to develop hybrid approaches that combine reactive behaviour with 
higher-level learning and reasoning abilities.  
 
But let us have a more detailed look at some indicative approaches to anticipation in the 
field of autonomous agents. For example Butz, Stolzmann and colleagues (e.g. Butz et al 
2002; Gérard et al 2002) have developed a class of mechanisms called anticipatory 
learning classifier systems. These systems are informed by the psychological learning 
theory of anticipatory behavioural control (Hoffmann 1993) and contain an explicit 
prediction component. The predictive model consists of a population of classifiers, each 
representing a condition-action-anticipation rule. The learning process starts with most 
general rules and gradually generates more specialised classifiers thus building a 
complete internal representation of the environment. The learning process compares the 
anticipation produced by each classifier in an action set (i.e. the prediction produced 
about the effects of an action) with the real next situation, and either modifies the 
classifier, or generates a new one. In this framework both generalisation and direct 
specialisation mechanisms are used. 
 
Another approach is exemplified in the framework discussed by Ekdahl and his 
colleagues (Ekdahl et al 1995; Ekdahl 2000) who see anticipation as a characteristic of 
the situations in which agency occurs. They take a linguistic approach to anticipatory 
agents and propose a distinction between descriptive and model-based anticipation; while 
description-based anticipatory agents are based decisively on Rosen's model, model-
based agents also have a meta-level component, which allows them to interpret the 
predictive model (see Figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 The basic architecture of an anticipatory agent by Ekdahl et al (1995) 
 
 
The authors recognise that such an approach may lead to infinite regress as Rosen had 
pointed out, but they suggest that the problem can be disregarded because of time 
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Env  Env restrictions that exist in situations involving agents. Nevertheless, they see this hybrid 
architecture as a promising framework for examining issues of self-reference and 
autonomy in general, while being cautious not to neglect linguistic restrictions posed for 
the realisation of anticipatory agents in computer systems. 
 
From a more philosophical standpoint, Christensen and Hooker (2000) discuss their view 
of agency as something deeply rooted in the organisational characteristics of life, and of 
which autonomy, adaptiveness and anticipation are three integral aspects. According to 
this view, intelligence lies in the organisational conditions of complex systems and is 
taken to emerge through increasing self-directedness. The notion of self-directedness 
refers to the ability of a system (agent) to adapt on the basis of formed anticipations and 
shape system-environment interaction in ways that are beneficial for maintaining 
autonomy. This is a constructivist approach to agency, in that it highlights the importance 
for agents to be able to interact with the environment, evaluate this interaction and 
modulate their future behaviour and action, including changes in the interacting parts of 
the environment. Reflecting on Rosen's original formulation of the conditions for 
anticipatory systems (see above) they suggest that their proposed framework may provide 
an additional account for aspects of autonomy such as the formation and pursuit of goals, 
as well as the use of feedback to guide adaptation and learning. 
 
Christensen and Hooker are in fact part of a constructivist/dynamic systems 'school' 
within artificial intelligence that emphasises the importance of taking into account the 
dynamics of system-environment interaction (Beer 1995; Pfeifer 1995; Smithers 1995; 
Prem 1997; Edmonds 1999; Quick et al 2000). These approaches are tightly linked with 
the study and development of embodied agents. For example, Pfeifer (1995) is one of the 
few who looks particularly at anticipatory behaviour, in a robot developed based on his 
'distributed adaptive control' architecture. Pfeifer concludes that such behaviour can only 
be seen as a product of the interplay between computational mechanisms, environmental 
features, and physical attributes of the robot (Pfeifer 1995: 56). He additionally suggests 
that a sufficient account of this behaviour would have to include factors that go beyond 
the information processing paradigm. Another example is the work of Quick et al (2000) 
who go on to devise a definition of embodiment based on the idea of mutual perturbation 
between system and environment, such that can enable structural coupling between the 
two. The notion of structural coupling is taken from Maturana and Varela (1980) and 
stands in line with the view that behaviour can be observed in the interplay between 
system and environment. Furthermore, this definition suggests that higher-level cognitive 
capabilities (i.e. such as intentionality, learning and anticipation) could also be explained 
on the basis of the relationship between agent and environment, the sensorimotor 
repertoire of the agent and the properties of its structural coupling with the environment 
(Dautenhahn et al 2002: 408).  
 
Riegler (2001; 2003), another 'constructivist', involved in the investigation of the role of 
anticipation in cognition, agrees with Dubois in regarding Rosen's approach as a weak 
form of anticipation.  He alternatively suggests that anticipation, and the process of 
creating an individual world-view as a means for understanding and acting in the world, 
is indeed a fundamentally constructive process - but one that characteristically does not 
lie beneath conscious mechanisms. Drawing from evidence related to 'stubbornness' in 
reasoning in humans, or to kinds of inborn and emotional (instinct-driven) anticipation in 
animals, he reflects the internal model hypothesis, proposing instead that anticipation is 
caused by 'canalization'. According to Riegler, canalization is a consequence of system organisation, and denotes constraints imposed on individuals from the way various 
elements of experience are interlocked in a constructed hierarchy of schemata, which act 
as internal hypotheses to guide future action. In contrast to the anticipatory classifiers 
discussed above, these schemata do not have a component responsible for formulating 
expectations but are only composed by a condition-sequence of actions duplet.  
 
Additionally to the concepts of intelligence, autonomy, adaptability or embodiment in 
single agents, anticipation has also been studied in relation to concepts of coordination 
and cooperation in groups of agents. For example Davidsson (1997) presents a framework 
for linearly anticipatory agents based directly on Rosen’s formulation. Each agent 
consists of a reactive component, a world model and an anticipatory component. The 
anticipatory component uses the world model to make predictions and guide agent 
behaviour by adapting the reactive component, which carries out a rotating sequence of 
perception (including other agents), action selection and execution. The experiments 
describe the use of this architecture to guide learning in simple competitive and 
cooperative multi-agent tasks. Another example where reactivity and anticipation are 
combined in a multi-agent setting is described by El hadouaj et al (2000). They discuss a 
multi-agent simulation of road traffic where the ability to look ahead in space is linked to 
the ability to look ahead in time and forecast future conflicts. The most 'famous' example 
however, has to be the work of Veloso et al (1999) who used multi-agent anticipation in 
their winning team of agents competing in the RoboCup-98 tournament. Anticipation is 
seen as a means to achieve better social utility and maximise the probability of future 
collaboration among agents. This is achieved with the combination of two key elements: a 
decision theoretic selection of the active agent using a single-step look ahead algorithm, 
and a dynamic strategic positioning of the passive agents who take into account both the 
location of the other agents and the attacking goal to anticipate their future contributions 
to the team. It is interesting to note here that the connection between expectation 
formation and concepts of cooperation, conflict, and coordination, goes back to the theory 
of games first introduced by John Von Neuman and Oskar Morgensten in 1944. Game 
theory is generally concerned with modelling and predicting rational decision making in 
groups of individual players who seek to employ appropriate strategies in order to satisfy 
their goals and achieve preferred outcomes. Preferences are typically captured by a 
measure of expected utility, and players are assumed to act so as to maximise this utility 
through a process of assessing the future choices of others. The classical framework 
generally suggests that agents act perfectly rationally, they have consistent preferences, 
and complete access to information about future actions/choices. The recognition of the 
fact that information cannot always be readily and fully available to agents, as well as that 
agents do not always behave consistently, nor do they possess infinite information 
processing capability, led to the formalisation of the bounded rationality hypothesis 
(Simon 1957). The idea of bounded rationality has a significant effect on the way 
expectation formation is approached: it implies that the process is not only affected by 
'objectively' defined external factors, but also by factors relative to the way the agents 
perceive their environment and themselves acting within it. This is closer to the view of 
anticipation as involving the construction of an internal model. An interesting approach to 
expectation formation given the effects of bounded rationality is expressed by Arthur 
(1994) who links expectation formation to hypothesis generation and evaluation by 
considering decision making as an inductive reasoning process that involves forming 
temporal expectations.   
 Let us now summarise the different approaches to anticipation
1 and draw attention to 
some key issues, especially with reference to Rosen’s paradigm. In general terms, we can 
discern from the examples above two major classes of approaches: one that considers 
anticipation as a sophisticated cognitive capability which needs to be studied at a high 
representational and/or semantic level; and one that considers anticipation as an intrinsic 
characteristic which underlines complex behaviour in all kinds of dynamic systems, 
natural and artificial. Rosen considered anticipation as a characteristic attribute of 
biological systems and stressed the existence of a parallel between natural languages and 
organisms, in the sense that they both possess semantic modes of entailment that cannot 
be encapsulated in a syntactic formalisation, a formal system, or a machine (Rosen 1991: 
247). His premise was that traditional reactive approaches were inadequate to deal with 
anticipation; but this has often led to a common perception of the internal predictive 
model (what is an indispensable condition for anticipation in Rosen’s view) as a 
necessarily cognitive one. This is somewhat paradoxical if we consider the primary 
examples Rosen chose to illustrate his point:  the M-R model of a living cell (as discussed 
above), or the model of a biosynthetic pathway with a forward activation step (see Rosen 
1985: 349-354). Rosen’s point was instead to illustrate that anticipation is a corollary of 
complexity, which pertains to the modelling enterprise itself and is crucially linked to the 
existence of an observer. In this fashion he associated complexity to the concept of error 
and related the appearance of bifurcations with our ability to produce enough independent 
encodings so as to fully describe a given natural system (Rosen 1985: 83). Thus, his 
concept of anticipation served a dual purpose: first, to formulate a relational definition of 
organisms as a general class of systems superseding traditional views of biological 
systems as mechanisms, and second, to devise an alternative approach to complexity that 
captures our intuitive understanding of it as something related to the appearance of 
bifurcations and the emergence of unexpected behaviours.  
 
Although the question as to whether an anticipatory system could in principle be realised 
computationally is still open, it is nevertheless true that both dynamic systems 
perspectives and artificial intelligence have been offering a fertile ground for 
investigation of anticipation and related notions. Amongst the various arguments that seek 
to establish links between anticipation and concepts such as complexity, autonomy, 
adaptability, embodiment or coordination, there is one that seems particularly worthwhile 
our investigation. This corresponds to the ever-sustained duality between system and 
environment. Rosen had detected this duality in the machine metaphor of biological 
systems and the restrictions that posed to the understanding of final causation, and so 
strove to dissolve it by offering a formalism of organisms as systems whose fabrication 
process is entailed within them. However, as we have seen, many others have highlighted 
the importance of taking into account the mutual affects of system-environment 
interaction in the scientific investigation of agency in natural and artificial worlds. For 
example, Maturana and Varela’s (1980) idea of structural coupling, the focus on 
establishing mutual perturbatory channels between robots and their environment (Quick 
et al 2000, Dautenhahn et al 2002) and the more explicit request for including interacting 
aspects of the environment in the process of achieving and sustaining organisational 
closure (Christensen and Hooker 2000), all disclose a need for re-evaluating the relation 
between internal and external, observation and action, or interaction and creation. 
                                                 
1 Although this section is aimed to provide an overview of the main approaches to anticipation, it is not 
exhaustive. For a full view of the work in the field see the Computing Anticipatory Systems (CASYS) 
Conference Proceedings, that appear annually since 1997 and are edited by Dubois, as well as the book 
edited by Butz et al (2003). Obviously anticipation seems to be an important aspect for understanding, modelling or 
even constructing the world (any world), and is also strongly related to scientific 
investigation per se. But how does anticipation relate to design in particular, and what is 
the specific answer design science has to offer (if it has) in relation to the notion of 
anticipation? We will explore these questions in the following section. 
 
3. Design and anticipation 
Design is recognised as a fundamental instrument of change in the world. It is considered 
to be a natural human activity but it is also often seen as a characteristic sign of 
intelligence. Not surprisingly then, the study of design has been approached from many 
different angles and disciplines ranging for example from theology, to philosophy, 
biology, cognitive science, social science, computer science and engineering. Although 
there is no generally accepted definition of design, it is usually perceived as a purposeful, 
constraint decision-making process, which aims to synthesise descriptions of artefacts to 
be realised or implemented (Braha and Maimon 1997; Gero 2000). Seeing design as a 
purposeful activity implies explaining the final configuration by way of the (desired) 
function it fulfils; namely, providing final cause explanations seems to be one of the most 
distinguishing characteristics of design 'worlds'. Additionally, Smithers (2002: 7) notes 
that in the core of what is design(-ing) lies an apparent paradox: designing has to do with 
arriving at a solution to a problem which is not a-priori specified. In other words, 
although design is driven by a need or goal, this goal (i.e. the final cause) is actually 
constructed by the very process of designing. This attribute has been increasingly 
receiving attention in design studies, and corresponds to views of design as exploration or 
co-evolution where emphasis is put on the integration of problem finding and problem 
solving (Smithers 1998; Maher 2000; Dorst and Cross 2001). From all that we have 
discussed in the previous section, it seems now rather natural to associate design with 
anticipation; design seems to be intrinsically linked with a process of adapting to or 
moving towards internally 'constructed' expectations about future changes (note: the word 
internally here is used to suggest that the construction of expectations is an integral part 
of designing and that final cause explanations should be given from within the design 
process or system). This association has been hinted in various studies as we shall see 
below, but it has never been explicitly asserted and/or put in context. Yet, doing so would 
allow us to not only arrive at a potentially overarching view of design, but more 
importantly to provide a generic account of design as science. This has a number of 
upshots for the understanding and consequent development of design systems. But let us 
first investigate in more detail how different design studies have incorporated different 
notions or aspects of anticipation.  
 
One of the most fundamental subject matters in design research is creative design, which 
is often linked with the phenomenon of emergence. Is there a notion of anticipation 
related to this fundamental aspect of design? The answer is yes, although at first sight the 
relation seems to be a negative one. Emergence is commonly associated with a 
spontaneous discovery of some new attribute (form, structure, or function) of the design 
description or artefact, which has not been expected or anticipated. However, this view of 
emergence is increasingly being challenged within the design community. For example, 
looking at visual emergence in design, Oxman (2002) puts forward a view of 'anticipated 
emergence' that contradicts the traditional definition. She suggests that the emergence of 
shapes is due to a process of resolution of shape ambiguities that relies both on 
perception, as well as cognition and the ability to 'think with shapes'. According to her 
approach, emergence is therefore not accidental but it is canalised by high-level cognitive schemata, which guide the resolution of shape ambiguities. Knight (2003) also examines 
the link between emergence and unpredictability and talks about the classification of 
emergent shapes in shape grammars into three classes: anticipated, possible and 
unanticipated. According to her view, anticipated emergence constitutes a key to analysis 
applications of shape grammars where the emergence of shapes is carefully predicted, 
whereas possible emergence involves the formation of conjectures about the emergence 
of shapes from (again intentionally) applied rules. Finally, unanticipated emergence is 
considered to play an important role in conceptual and creative stages of design and 
involves the generation of shapes that are not premeditated in any way. Interestingly, 
Knight highlights that the classification of shapes into the aforementioned categories is 
'relative to the knowledge and eye of the author or user of grammar' (ibid: 135), and 
further elaborates ways by which emergent shapes can be used as input for further 
computations. Likewise, starting from a classical example of visual emergence, Brown 
(1998) notes that the appearance of a new shape is something that occurs even if we do 
have prior knowledge of the phenomenon: that is, emergence can be expected. On this 
basis he distinguishes between two types of emergence: the first, directly identifiable 
emergence, occurs when the identification of a new property can be traced back in the 
existing knowledge of a person, whereas the second, indirectly identifiable emergence, is 
linked to a discovery process of setting apart a property as interesting and hence worth 
remembering and classifying. Brown further suggests that identification of an emergent 
property comes about by way of analogical and/or functional reasoning, the latter being 
concerned with the use, or purpose, of a design artefact.  
 
Working along similar lines, Gero (1998; 2003) links the notion of emergence to that of 
situatedness, proposing that what one 'sees' is affected by both the situation he or she is in 
(what is 'out there') and the previous knowledge available which guides what one is 
'looking for'. A fundamental characteristic of his approach, which draws on situated views 
of cognition and intelligence, is the notion of constructive memory.  The driving idea is 
that memory is not only constructed by experience, but it is also re-interpreted and re-
constructed in the light of the present situation. Gero further exploits the concepts of 
situatedness and constructive memory to devise a model of designing that can form the 
basis for the development of situated design agents (Gero and Kannengieser 2002). The 
model considers situation as something that incorporates three different kinds of 
environments, the external world, the interpreted world and the expected world, linked to 
one another with the processes of interpretation, focussing and action. While the external 
world consists of representations outside the design agent, the interpreted world consists 
of internal representations of the part of the external world that the agent interacts with. 
The expected world is also formed within the agent and constitutes the environment 
where the effects of actions are predicted according to current goals and interpretations of 
the external world. The process of focussing works as a link between the interpreted and 
the expected world as it distinguishes aspects of the interpreted world to be used as goals 
in the expected world and suggests actions to be executed so as to produce states that 
reach these goals (ibid: 93-94). Notably, in this framework the formation of expectations 
is considered fundamental for both the formation of internal representations and the 
construction of memories. The differentiation between external, interpreted and expected 
world is tellingly reminiscent of the most classical and fundamental perception of 
anticipation, which considers that a model of the external world (or environment) 
constructed within a system (here design agent) could be used to form expectations about 
future changes and guide current action. 
 The ability of agents to interpret and act in the external world by constructing internal 
representations of this world based on memories, experiences and expectations, is 
generally associated with the ability to reason reflectively about the situation they find 
themselves in (in line with Schön’s (1983) arguments about reflection in action). While 
Gero focuses primarily on reflective reasoning as a characteristic of individual cognition, 
others emphasise more the need for reflective reasoning as a consequence of the limited 
and partial knowledge available to agents in distributed design settings (in line with the 
bounded rationality hypothesis discussed above). For example, Brazier et al (2001: 137) 
argue that in distributed design where multiple agents need to combine their efforts to 
achieve a design solution, agents should be endowed with the ability to reason reflectively 
about additional elements, such as design partners, design culture and shared 
understanding of the design problem. The authors suggest that reasoning about the 
knowledge and experience of other agents and their expected actions and results, as well 
as reasoning about the types and content of interactions, involves reasoning with 
imprecise and incomplete knowledge and it is therefore to some extent hypothetical. 
Another example, where the focus on distributed design brings about the need for 
expectation formation, is found in Grecu and Brown (2000) The idea of anticipation is 
again put forward (although the word expectation is used instead) in relation to the 
necessity for agents to learn and evaluate advantages and disadvantages of a decision by 
predicting conflict situations or potential future goals and functions. The role of 
expectations is to compensate for restrictions related to time and information, which 
produce difficulties in establishing causal relationships between conditions that underline 
an event or action, and its results (deductively derived knowledge) (ibid: 656-657). The 
authors hence suggest the use of two types of expectations to guide agent learning: 
expectations that act as substitutes for precondition information and expectations that act 
as tools for inferring the effects of decisions. Finally, Zamenopoulos and Alexiou (2003) 
also discuss a formalisation of distributed design as a coordination problem, which takes 
into account the need for knowledge construction and co-evolution of the problem and 
solution spaces, but also explicitly suggests that this constructive process entails 
formation, evaluation and re-interpretation of (expected) future design descriptions (what 
the authors call the 'memory of the future', ibid: 193). 
 
This brief review of studies, which establish links between anticipation and design, 
reveals some interesting points. Clearly, anticipation emerges as an important 
characteristic of designing decisively linked to phenomena such as creativity and 
emergence, and design 'abilities' such as generation of problems and solutions, formation 
of expectations, prediction and evaluation, and construction of goals and functions. 
However, as we mentioned at the beginning of this section, the way anticipation is 
perceived and expressed plays a critical role in the way design in general, and design 
systems in particular, are studied. The typical association of anticipation with designing 
as a cognitive process generally indicates a focus on individual design agents as the unit 
of analysis for design systems. The main assumption holding is that design abilities are 
fully embedded and embodied in a human or artificial design agent. That is, design 
abilities are coupled with, but external to the design situation or environment. Indeed, the 
studies mentioned above recognise the significance of reflective action, the constructive 
role of the situation, or the social and distributed character of design knowledge and 
abilities, and take steps towards a re-evaluation of the boundaries between system (design 
agent) and its environment  (external world). Nonetheless, the explanation of design 
phenomena derives predominantly from the investigation of structural components of 
design systems – these may be human designers, design artefacts, or computer constructs – and their interaction. Design abilities are in turn directly attributed to and explained on 
the basis of these structural components. Such studies are undoubtedly invaluable and 
have proved to be successful in many respects, but they offer no explanations as to how 
design abilities emerge, or how a design system is generated. Seemingly, alternative 
explanations are needed that can potentially go beyond the bounds of structural 
description and shed some light into these questions. This refers to a route of research (in 
line with Rosen’s paradigm) that strives to offer functional explanations of design 
phenomena by alternatively focusing on the organisational level of design systems. Let us 
now examine how such a methodology could be pursued to develop a framework for a 
formal definition of design systems based on the concept of anticipation.  
 
4. Towards an organisational view of design systems 
Adopting an organisational view of design and design systems implies focussing on a 
fundamentally different research problem for design science. Instead of investigating the 
kinds of structures that can embody design abilities, we will be focusing here on the 
question of how to decide if a given system is a design system, or consequently, if an 
observed world is a design world. In the following we will seek to define the 
organisational conditions that enable design abilities to emerge in systems and then 
describe a specific formalisation such that any of its realisations would in principle 
constitute a design world. 
 
From the studies presented above we can distil some critical requirements or conditions 
for encompassing anticipation in design systems. Put succinctly, a design system needs: 
a) to have a way to express design problems and establish relations between design 
variables – that is, include a language by which to carry out the generation of possible 
worlds where solutions can be found, b) to entail the conditions for its operation – that is, 
entail a way to reformulate the set of possible problems and solutions according to 
evidence in the actual world, and c) to entail final cause explanations – that is, construct 
internally future purpose(s) or function(s) for the design artefact. These conditions 
suggest that the realisation of design systems requires the composition of actual, possible 
and design worlds in a specific organisation. Before we attempt to formalise this 
organisation, we will first make some notes about traditional views of design systems and 
investigate whether they fulfil these conditions. We will argue that the majority of studies 
in design have implicitly or explicitly embraced the machine paradigm in science, which 
has restricted our ability to define design systems and understand design worlds. Let us 
first introduce some general notation and briefly present the main underlining 
assumptions behind the machine paradigm.  
 
Adopting a system-theoretic terminology, we can generally assert that the fundamental 
aspiration of science is to establish causal relationships between observables (abstract 
equivalent classes) established within the world of interest. In this sense, an observed 
world W can be expressed by a mapping, or function, that transforms inputs to outputs 
(causes to effects), and can be represented as follows: 
 
(7a) 
 
 
We can rewrite (7a) as (7b) to distinguish between F that represents the binary relation 
between A and B, and T that represents the ternary relation between F, A and B:  
 
f: A  →   B (7b) 
 
 
In more detail, we can consider that F constitutes a language by which the relation 
between A (initial conditions or premises) and B (effects or theorems) is formalised. The 
definition and use of a language F is of critical importance in our attempt to model the 
world W: language is the tool by which we can define possible states of the world. The 
definition of T is also critical as it is somewhat responsible for the evaluation, or 
execution of F. The mapping (7b) can take many different forms. To give an example, in 
the field of computing A and B would represent the sets of input and output symbols 
respectively,  F would represent the hardware and T would represent the computation 
process itself: the running of the program to calculate outputs B.  
 
Having this notation we can now discuss the machine paradigm. In abstract terms, the 
machine view of the world proposes that the main question or problem to solve in order to 
understand, describe and generate possible worlds, is to find an effective procedure T (a 
computable or describable process) that can compute B given a programme or equation of 
states F and some initial conditions a∈A. In more logic theoretic terms, the world W and 
the effects B are presumably deduced by simply knowing the history of the system and 
the conditions a. The claim put forward is that there exists a describable process T such 
that can compute (or simulate) any formal description of the world W, namely the 
machine is the largest model of the world. Based on this paradigm a plethora of different 
abstractions has been developed, which in general either refine or introduce more 
structure (restrictions) to the machine formalism. For example, the paradigms of self-
reproduction and evolution narrow down the machine assumptions by imposing 
restrictions related to complexity and hence the nature of the effect B: Self-reproduction 
assumes that there is an automaton T that can produce B such that the complexity of B is 
equal to the complexity of F. In this sense the world W is able to entail structures of the 
same complexity and hence reproduce itself. Evolution assumes that there is a process T 
that can generate another automaton B of greater complexity. In this sense the world W is 
able to increase its complexity. The proposed model of variation-selection-permutation is 
a specification of how this structure can be realized. Other abstractions impose some kind 
of a meta-structure on the machine metaphor: In cybernetics the assumption holds that 
there is a formal process Fc within a machine T that can reduce the complexity of the 
environment (expressed by A) by producing the appropriate B. In other words the effect B 
can be endowed with a purpose or function; a characteristic that was missing from 
machine structures. Finally, artificial intelligence generally  assumes that the world W 
cannot be simply described by deductive steps:  there is no such process T that can 
deductively prove B.  The assumption put forward instead is that there is another process 
Fi at a meta-level able to define an F that can heuristically prove B. The assumptions and 
fundamental questions posed by the machine paradigm and its different 'offspring' are 
summarised in Table 1 below. 
 
As we mentioned, design studies have generally assumed these paradigms as a way to 
understand and formalise design worlds and thereafter develop design systems. For 
example, many studies have assumed the machine metaphor to develop various 
algorithms and grammars to realise design worlds (Stiny and March 1981; Stiny 1991), 
while others have developed and used genetic and evolutionary algorithms to solve 
optimisation problems or generate and evolve novel forms (Frazer 1995; Rosenman 1996; 
Bentley 1999). Cybernetic and systemic approaches have influenced studies on design 
T  
(F, a)  →   B methods during the ‘60s (Asimov 1962; Archer 1965) and have also been implicitly or 
explicitly assumed in mathematical studies of design (Braha and Maimon 1998; Suh 
2001). Finally, the paradigm of artificial intelligence has largely influenced the study of 
design as a problem solving activity formalised as search and (latter) exploration (Goel 
and Pirolli 1989; Chandrasekaran 1990; Smithers 1998; Maher 2000), and has generally 
inspired the formation of cognitive approaches to design processes and the development 
of knowledge based systems (Gero 1990; Coyne et al 1990). Now the question here 
arises: do these paradigms entail the critical conditions we considered to be necessary for 
encompassing anticipation in our view of design systems?  If we examine the machine 
formalisation in more detail we will see that these fundamental conditions are in fact 
violated. 
 
Machine paradigm  (F, a)  →   B   Find T such that ∀F C(T) ⊃ C(F) 
Self-organisation  (F, a)  →   B   Find T such that C(B) = C(F) 
Evolution  (F, a)  →   B   Find T such that C(B) > C(F) 
Cybernetics 
(?Fc, a)  →   B  
 
                (F, b)  →   A 
Find Fc such that C(A) is reduced 
Artificial Intelligence 
(?Fi, a)  →   B  
 
                (F, b)  →   F 
Find Fi such that F can be defined 
 
Table 1 The machine paradigm and its offspring: fundamental questions and assumptions 
 
 
The realisation of the causal mapping represented in (7a) and (7b) offers a series of 
explanations that aim to justify why the set of effects B has been generated. We have 
previously explored Rosen’s arguments with regards to this mapping. Let us have another 
look at these arguments with the help of the diagram (8).   
 
 
 
(8) 
 
 
 
 
We can see more clearly that B can be entailed by a (material cause), and f (formal and 
efficient cause in this case). We can also see that there is nothing to explain B by its 
effects in this diagram, as there is nothing to ensure a function is given to B from within 
the system. Notably, the opposite holds for f and a: they can only be explained in 
finalistic terms (because of their function in the diagram). There is no material, formal or 
efficient entailment neither for f (the language, or program which associates observables 
in the world and generates possible worlds) nor for a, the material conditions that guide 
the operation of the system. This dual relationship between system and environment has 
some very important implications for design systems. It effectively suggests that if we are 
to assume a design system with the characteristics we explicated previously, then this 
system must be found in the environment. Because it is the environment that entails both 
the language of the system and the conditions of its operation, and it is the environment 
?T 
?T 
?T 
f  
A   →    B  
E  
h   g  that assigns purpose to the system. It follows that if design worlds are to be formally 
represented we need to include more structure into the initial formalism: we need to 
include the environment into it. Note that this is not a new idea: as we saw, the inclusion 
of environment into the system is what abstract worlds such as cybernetic and artificial 
intelligence worlds have been striving to achieve. As Rosen discussed, if we wish to 
include the environment we need to extend the mapping (7b) by adding a new function: 
as seen in (3). This is a very convenient addition because f can now be efficiently 
entailed, and a function can be given to B. However, it can similarly be shown that the 
new function φf will be unentailed and the 'designer' will again have to be found 
somewhere in the environment. We can continue this process of adding functions 
infinitely… Rosen formulated the (M, R) formalism (4) so as to overcome this apparent 
infinite regress and close the system to efficient causation. This is an important step from 
the point of view of design systems. The formalism meets two of the conditions we 
specified at the beginning of this section: it is able to entail the definition of a language (f) 
by which to carry out the generation of possible worlds and it is able to entail its future 
purpose and function. Yet, there is still something missing. In diagram (9) we can see that 
the material cause a remains unentailed: the conditions that bound the operation of the 
system and guide the re-definition of the language by which problems and solutions are 
expressed, are still to be found in the environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
(9) 
 
 
 
 
It is clear that an additional closure condition needs to be formulated. Our proposition is 
to define the set D as a set of functions with the logical form  B⇒[A⇒B] whose 
evaluation defines the condition a∈A (10).   
 
 
 
 
(10) 
 
 
 
 
 
We have now reached our ultimate aim. Diagram (10) seemingly encodes all the 
necessary conditions for the definition and explanation of design systems. We suggest 
that this formalism provides a framework by which to decide when a given system is a 
design system (any realisation of this formalism would in principle constitute a design 
system), and can subsequently improve our ability to observe and characterise design 
worlds. We mentioned at the beginning of this section that the realisation of design 
systems requires a specific composition of actual, possible and design worlds. Let us try 
to elucidate this composition in more detail. The first mapping represents a function that 
A  →   B  →  C=H(A,B)  →  D=H(B, H(A,B)) 
f  φf βb
E  
h  
A  →   B  →  H(A,B)  →  H(B, H(A,B))=A 
f  φf βblinks certain observables to their effects in the observed world, and therefore can be 
considered as an expression of a problem within the actual world. The second mapping 
corresponds to a process of rule extraction from observations, which associates initial 
conditions with expected results, and therefore can be considered as a description of 
possible worlds. The third mapping corresponds to a process which, given the general 
rules generated and the actual state of the world, formulates new premises or hypotheses 
for the observed world. As the mapping refers to a process of both producing solutions 
that fulfil expected outcomes and reassessing the formulation of the initial problem that 
the system seeks to solve, it can be considered as a characteristic expression of design 
worlds. In effect, although actual and possible worlds are bounded by design worlds 
within a hierarchical composition of mappings, observations and effects in the actual 
world seem to restrict the generation of design worlds at a most fundamental level. This 
can be written in terms of subset relations as follows: 
 
(11) 
 
Before we conclude this discussion, it is important to stress that although the formalism 
suggested in (10) designates when a system can be considered to be a design system, it 
does not define the structures that could be used to realise it. In other words, the diagram 
does not specify individual components of a design system, but it rather explicates the 
conditions that relate them or link them together in terms of function. This is the most 
essential feature of the organisational approach.  
 
5. Discussion 
The motivation for pursuing this line of research is to bring the study of design at a 
different level of abstraction concerned with the organisational features of design 
systems. An organisational view of design does not only offer an account of design 
phenomena and abilities irrespective of their structural components (whether these are 
human designers, design artefacts, or computer constructs), but can also potentially 
broaden our ability to explore, explain and understand complex realities. If science in 
general is occupied with the exploration of actual and possible worlds, we see design 
science as the science that complements this exploration by linking actual, possible and 
design worlds together. 
 
In this sense, the study presented here can be seen as a framework for reconsidering the 
role, scope and requirements of decision support systems. The view adopted suggests that 
there is a need to move from the exclusive study of algorithms and programs to the study 
of high-level (abstract) functions such as learning and adaptation and the exploration of 
organisational concepts such as coordination. Moreover, the formalism developed puts 
forward a view of design systems as being fundamentally open to interaction and coupled 
with the environment within which they operate. This is in line with most of the studies 
that consider the idea of anticipation in relation to design, and essentially draw attention 
to the importance of re-evaluating the boundaries between system and environment. Not 
unlike proponents of situated or distributed cognition who place emphasis on interactions 
between agents and with external representations, tools and artefacts (Arias et al 2000; 
Hollan et al 2000; Gero 2003), this study sees design(-ing) as a process developed 
inevitably within a socio-technical context. Rather than focussing on how design abilities 
can be embodied within computational constructs, this study aspires to take a step 
towards developing computer systems that are open to human interaction and support the 
emergence of design abilities through this interaction. This view is to a certain degree 
Actual Worlds ⊆ Possible Worlds ⊆ Design Worlds ⊆ Actual Worlds also relevant to emerging research on socially intelligent agents, which seeks to 
investigate and establish relationships among humans and machines by putting the human 
in the loop (Dautenhahn et al 2002). 
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